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Abstract
Local business associations can be important mechanisms for stimulating inter-firm cooperation
leading to economic growth and development. However, previous research suggests that the
unfulfilled expectations of their members can lead to low participation, high membership churn
and network instability over time. As a departure from studies that have explored why local
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and thick models of rational choice, respectively, are identified in explaining why firms join and
remain part of associations. The relevance of these bundles to members was found to vary with
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Introduction
Business associations have been described as powerful tools for fostering inter-ﬁrm
co-operation and, as a result, economic development (Besser and Miller, 2010; Huggins,
2000). They come in many shapes and sizes. Some are sector/profession speciﬁc, others are
more cross cutting in focus, and they range from formal chambers of commerce to informal
business clubs. While some nationally organised business associations exist (such as the
Federation of Small Businesses in the UK), most operate on a far smaller geographical
scale and are locally oriented (Bennett and Ramsden, 2007). These Local Business
Associations (LBAs) may provide a range of collective and individual beneﬁts to
members, facilitating business growth and strengthening social relationships between
participants (Bennett and Ramsden, 2007; Huggins, 2000).
Previous research considers in detail the process of network formation (Lockett et al.,
2013), the potential facilitating role of external actors or brokers (Huggins, 2000), the
determinants of network success (Newbery et al., 2013), and network governance (Davies
and Spicer, 2015) and evolution (Jack et al., 2008). The literature demonstrates that there are
a range of motivations for joining small business networks (Lawton Smith and Romeo, 2013;
Lockett et al., 2013). However, while attention has been paid to how beneﬁts are provided
(supply side), little consideration has been given to understanding the nature of, and reasons
for variation in, the beneﬁts sought by members. Such an understanding is critical if LBAs
are to meet the demands of new and established members and, in so doing, survive and
ﬂourish. This is particularly important for LBAs as they often experience low levels of
participation and high membership churn, with many networks suﬀering from instability
over time (Curran and Blackburn, 1994; Phillipson et al., 2006). Evidence to date suggests
that the expectations of members of LBAs often go unfulﬁlled, leading to them either
becoming non-active or leaving the association altogether (Bennett, 2011; Laschewski
et al., 2002).
This paper analyses the beneﬁts sought by members, drawing on a large and original
demand side survey of local business associations. It begins by discussing the ways in which
membership beneﬁts have been theorised to date, focusing on ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ rational
choice approaches, and the nature of ‘beneﬁt bundles’. The paper then details the
approach to data collection and analysis. The latter draws on factor and cluster analysis
to classify the main beneﬁts sought, the composition of ‘beneﬁt bundles’ and variations in
the beneﬁts sought by members. We then consider the signiﬁcance of the research for the
leadership of LBAs in meeting members’ aspirations as a key ingredient for network
sustainability.
Rational choice explanations for LBA membership
Rational choice perspectives suggest that a business owner/manager’s decision to become
and remain a member of a LBA is contingent upon a comparison of beneﬁts versus costs
(Becker, 1965; Olson, 1971). In other words, action follows from a calculation of
consequences. There are two main versions of rational choice theory: thin and thick. In
thin models, actors are self-interested and hold preferences which are stable and transitive
(Hechter and Kanazawa, 1997). In pursuing their own interests, it is assumed that
individuals possess perfect information and utilise this to calculate the best course of
action to maximise their utility or in the case of small-business owners, proﬁt
(Goldthorpe, 1998). Thus, in thin rational choice models, pecuniary rewards drive
entrepreneurial actions.
2 Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 0(0)
Olson (1971) draws on the thin perspective to explain individuals’ decisions to join
groups. He argues that an individual’s choice to join or remain a member of a group
depends on his or her personal returns in relation to personally incurred costs, rather
than any concern for the group’s collective interest. Groups may therefore be vulnerable
to free-riding – where individuals take the beneﬁt of membership, but let others bear the cost.
Olson (1971) argues that free-riding behaviour emerges after group-size crosses a size
threshold, enabling a lack of contribution to be hidden from social censure or
organisational sanction. Free-riding is most likely to arise in circumstances where the
beneﬁts of membership are not exclusive. Groups can provide a mixture of public and
private goods or beneﬁts. Public goods are non-exclusive and non-rivalrous. In other
words if they are provided for one actor, all others can gain as well. For example, if a
LBA successfully lobbies for improved car parking facilities in a town, all local businesses
beneﬁt regardless of whether they are members of the LBA or not. They are sometimes
referred to as collective beneﬁts (Bennett and Robson, 2001). In contrast, private goods are
exclusive and rivalrous in nature. For instance, if an LBA provided accountancy training to
members, it would be possible to exclude non-members from attending and therefore prevent
free-riding. This is an example of a selective beneﬁt (Bennett and Robson, 2001). Following
Olson (1971) and thin models of rational choice, larger LBAs will only be able to exist if they
provide selective beneﬁts to members. Collective beneﬁts, therefore, are only oﬀered as a
simultaneous by-product in a bundle of provision of selective beneﬁts to members (Bennett
and Robson, 2001).
Thin models of rational choice have been criticised as ‘essentialist’, suﬀering from an
adherence to methodological individualism, inappropriate conceptualisation of human
emotions and naı¨ve assumptions regarding perfect information and stability of preferences
(Archer and Tritter, 2000; Zey, 1998). This has led to alternative conceptualisations,
collectively labelled ‘thick’ models of rational choice (Goldthorpe, 1998). For instance,
whereas thin models treat an actor’s preferences as stable, so that a decision based on
preferences made at one point in time will be repeated at another point unless the rewards
and costs they face alter (Archer and Tritter, 2000), in thick models preferences are modiﬁed
by interaction with social structures, which are dynamic, ﬂuctuating over time and possess
fuzzy boundaries (Johannisson et al., 2002). Evidence from Ostrom and Gardner (1993)
indicates how the level of co-operation between individuals with a common interest
exceeds that predicted by ‘thin’ approaches. Thus, Ostrom (1998) argues that bounded
rationality and learnt norms of behaviour, or ‘rules of thumb’, contribute more to
successful action than ‘thin’ models allow. In other words, behaviourally ‘thick’ models
allow for core norms, such as reciprocity, trust and the collective interest, to become part
of the explanation (Ostrom, 1998).
An alternative angle within thick rational choice theory focuses on ideas of limited
rationality, which considers the diﬃculties of anticipating outcomes and implications of
imperfect information (March, 1978). This recognises that individuals often ﬁnd costs and
beneﬁts diﬃcult to identify and isolate (Gill and Gill, 2012). Group members may make
decisions and seek beneﬁts that are based on imperfect understandings of the cost/beneﬁt
payoﬀ. As such they may not aim to be optimisers, seeking the best payoﬀ, but rather
‘satisﬁcers’, seeking a satisfactory solution (Simon, 1991). In this case, rationality is
bounded by imperfect information and individuals’ capacity to calculate payoﬀs, so that
they may well seek courses of action which are ‘good enough’.
As a consequence, in the LBA context, whether through bounded rationality or the
pursuit of non-pecuniary goals, thick rational choice models recognise that members may
seek beneﬁts that are not concerned primarily with making calculative proﬁt maximisation
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decisions. In particular, thick models identify the importance of the varied and complex
social motivations for individual behaviour and how decision making is also aﬀected by
limited information (Goldthorpe, 1998; March, 1978). Thus, while thin rational choice
approaches conceptualise arms-length transactions, they may be a poor predictor of the
outcomes of socially embedded exchanges (Uzzi, 1996).
Of relevance within this context of thick rational choice is the notion of strong and weak
ties, referring to the nature of relationships that aﬀect members’ decision-making processes
(Granovetter, 1973). While strong relational ties within a community may lead to greater
solidarity and sense of local community belonging and support, they may also insulate the
community from external inﬂuences leading to atrophy. If there is too much emphasis on
strong ties, ‘lock-in’ eﬀects are more likely that may be detrimental to innovation,
adaptation and learning (Uzzi, 1996) and isolate businesses from regional, national and
global opportunities (Oinas, 1997). Thus, ‘strong’ relational ties between members of a
LBA may form the basis of a relatively stable and active membership core. While ‘weak’
relational ties may be characteristic of more transient relations involving a circulation of
business owners moving in or out of membership or who participate infrequently in the life
of the LBA (Cummings and Higgins, 2006). Over time some ties may strengthen or stabilise
as interactions between members are repeated, while other ties may weaken and dissolve.
Hence, a degree of membership stability may well be conducive to value creation over time,
but too much stability may potentially be detrimental to knowledge creation, network
dynamism and organisational adaptability (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006). As such, the
rationality of choice may change over time as a result of a dynamic and ever-changing
membership make-up (Huggins and Johnston, 2009).
Benefits sought and benefit bundles
Individual entrepreneurs may therefore join LBAs with an intention to access certain
beneﬁts. In keeping with thick models of rational choice these beneﬁts may be pecuniary
or non-pecuniary, public or private, and selective or collective in nature, and are thus
potentially manifold. They include access to new, or enhanced cooperation with existing,
customers, boosting sales and proﬁts. Other members of the association may be seen as
future clients, sources of information about potential customers (Phillipson et al., 2006),
or as a network of available services to enrich their own personal networks (Curran and
Blackburn, 1994). Associations can oﬀer access to promotional channels, for example,
through collective marketing via web or print directories (Reilly and Szabo, 2005) or
membership may enhance access to resources or lower their costs through relieving
businesses of the need to source specialised services independently (Gulati et al., 2000).
Knowledge acquisition and creation can also be vital (Van Cauwenberge et al., 2013).
Membership may improve an owner-manager’s awareness and understanding across
business functions, for example relating to recruitment of personnel (Lowik et al., 2012).
Other members can act as a sounding board for testing out new ideas. Social beneﬁts include
the opportunity to meet and mix with other business owners (Phillipson et al., 2006) and the
creation of ‘a sense of belonging’ in a local community (Curran and Blackburn, 1994: 169).
Lobbying and representation can occur where associations may act as a vehicle for
engagement with local councils or public bodies (Bennett, 2011). Finally, associations may
provide and maintain public goods, the beneﬁts of which are available to non-members.
Examples include improvements to the local physical environment, provision of car parks,
the preservation of historic and public assets, crime prevention, and the attraction of funding
for local initiatives (Medway et al., 2000; Reilly and Szabo, 2005).
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Multiple beneﬁts may be supplied by LBAs simultaneously as part of a service package or
‘bundle’ of beneﬁts (Bennett and Robson, 2001). This may reﬂect an inherent indivisibility
between beneﬁts, for example, where customer networking beneﬁts also bring reduced
isolation and an opportunity to socialise, so that they cannot be delivered as completely
independent beneﬁts. They may, however, be deliverable as distinct bundles of beneﬁts.
Depending on the association, the relative importance of these beneﬁt bundles may vary.
Bennett (2011) found that while the dominant bundle in Chambers of Commerce related to
service provision, in sector/trade associations it related to representation. What is less clear is
whether and how the perceived relevance of sought-after beneﬁt bundles varies between
groups of members within LBAs.
The provision of beneﬁts to members of LBAs has therefore been explained using two
primary approaches. One follows Olson’s (1971) logic of collective action and ‘thin’ rational
choice models, which explore group behaviour through instrumental cost-beneﬁt rationality.
In contrast, ‘thick’ models incorporate bounded rationality (Simon, 1991) and learnt
behavioural norms (Ostrom, 1998) and oﬀer an alternative framework for understanding
the beneﬁts sought by members. The remainder of this paper draws on the ﬁndings of a
membership survey to explore the degree to which these competing perspectives are able to
account for the nature of the beneﬁts sought by LBA members.
Methodology
Empirical research focused on 15 LBAs and their members, located in the north of England.
This region’s sectoral composition of ﬁrms resembles the UK as a whole (Atterton and
Aﬄeck, 2010). However, most economic and business enterprise statistics categorise the
north of England (north east region plus Cumbria) as lagging the rest of the UK. For
instance, the north east in 2013 had the highest rate of unemployment and the lowest
gross disposable household income of any UK region (ONS, 2015). Cumbria also has
above national average levels of unemployment and below average incomes. Birth rates of
new ﬁrms (expressed as a percentage of active enterprises) consistently lag the national
average in both the north east and Cumbria, by as much as 62% (ONS, 2015).
Speciﬁc LBAs were identiﬁed through an earlier, large-scale rural business survey
undertaken by the Centre for Rural Economy (Atterton and Aﬄeck, 2010) where a
question asked respondents whether they were members of a local business association or
network. Out of 830 usable responses, 46.5% reported they were members of general
business associations, such as the Federation for Small Businesses, and 10% identiﬁed
themselves as members of named LBAs. The research included all the LBAs identiﬁed at
the time, although two were excluded as they were considered inactive by their leadership.
The research also excluded larger Chambers of Commerce which, in terms of membership
base and focus, had a regional rather than local remit. Those LBAs surveyed were attached
to small towns, villages, and rural districts. By their nature these were small to medium in
size, with an average of 58 members (max. 159).
LBAs were also classiﬁed as either having a homogenous membership, in the case
of those dominated by a single sector such as tourism or retail, or heterogeneous,
involving a mixture of sectors. While some LBAs may have been founded by local public
bodies, all, with the exception of the Barney Guild, were supported by member subscription
at the time of the research. Two tourism associations also raised revenue through additional
fee-based services (Alnwick Tourism Association; Rothbury & Coquetdale Tourism
Association). Table 1 describes the LBAs by homogeneity of sector, funding type and
survey response rate.
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A preparatory phase for the membership survey included observation of 20 meetings of
LBAs and interviews with LBA leaders to gain an insight into the associations’ history,
objectives, and experiences. This also served to enhance support for the survey among
associations and their members. Leaders were formally interviewed in person and via
telephone and discussions held with them informally during membership meetings. In
general, they regarded the survey as a positive initiative which had the potential to
improve their association and raise its proﬁle within the wider community.
The survey questionnaire was pre-tested through academic focus groups and a pilot survey
of two associations. This received a response rate of 50%, a favourable ﬁgure compared
against other comparable surveys (Atterton and Aﬄeck, 2010). The pilot led to minor
modiﬁcations to the survey design. All the members of the selected LBAs were surveyed
with a postal questionnaire. To maximise response rates, a modiﬁed version of the ‘tailored
design method’ (Dillman, 2007) was used. This thorough method is based on a theory of social
exchange and advocates maximising contacts with potential respondents. As such, as well as
the participant observation of meetings and leadership interviews, an advance letter,
questionnaire pack, thank you/reminder postcard and, ﬁnally, a non-respondent follow-up
pack were sent out in sequence. Where this strategy was not followed, due to association rules,
the response rate was lower. For instance, the Berwick Chamber of Trade did not provide
access to its membership database and sent out only the questionnaire, with no advance letters
or reminders; consequently, the response rate was low (9%).
The questionnaire included a list of 11 potential beneﬁts derived from the literature and
validated by the interviews with LBA leaders. These included a collective voice; a contact
network; new customer contacts; access to local knowledge; peer support; reduction of
isolation; exchange of general information; an opportunity to socialise; a sounding board
for ideas, issues, and problems; an improved reputation; and greater visibility to customers.
LBA leaders regarded the list of beneﬁts as encompassing the range of services sought by
themselves and their members. Respondents were asked to rate the relevance of each
potential beneﬁt to them on a 5-point Likert scale where 1¼ not relevant to 5¼ very
relevant. The survey also included questions designed to capture relevant personal
perceptions relating to membership, business characteristics, engagement with the local
economy (sales and supplies), and association performance.
The ﬁnal response rate was 37% (n¼ 313 respondents). Table 1 details the response from
each participating association. Response rates varied from 9% to 57%. In part, this
variation can be ascribed to diﬀerences between associations in the available strategies for
contacting participants. There is also a small negative correlation between business
association level response rate and individual years of membership (.236 at 99% level),
demonstrating that newer members were more likely to respond to the survey.
The ﬁnal distribution of sampled members was skewed slightly towards more homogenous
associations. Considering the sample as a whole, the median membership was 3 years and a
mean of 6.8 years (spread between 0 and 60 years), with 43% of businesses describing their life-
stage as growing, 48% as steady state, and 8% as in decline (with 1% unsure). Respondents
were almost equally divided between males and females. Benchmark performance and speciﬁc
feedback was provided to each of the 15 LBAs.
Survey findings
What benefits and benefit bundles do LBA members seek?
Members were presented with a list of beneﬁts potentially provided by LBAs and asked how
relevant they were to their business needs. Table 2 shows the mean relevance for each
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potential beneﬁt. On average, all potential beneﬁts listed were seen as relevant, with averages
ranging from 3.01 to 3.85 The option ‘exchange of general information’ had the highest
overall mean score for relevance (3.85), followed by ‘access to local knowledge’ (3.82). The
least relevant potential beneﬁt was perceived to be ‘an opportunity to socialise’ (3.01).
Table 3 conﬁrms that beneﬁts are highly indivisible (correlated at the 99% level of
signiﬁcance). No beneﬁt was entirely separate from another. The high degree of
correlation suggested that the beneﬁts were a candidate for exploratory factor analysis to
identify the existence of structures or dimensions within the data. In addition to identifying
data structure, a key aim of principal component analysis is a reduction in the number of
variables (Hair et al., 2010). Using principal component analysis, two distinct bundles
of beneﬁts were identiﬁed, with a total variance explained of 66% and a data reduction
rate of 80% (Table 4). The beneﬁt of LBAs in providing a ‘Contact Network’ loaded equally
across both factors and its removal achieved exclusivity of loadings with no decrease in
signiﬁcance measured by Cronbach’s alpha. The two bundles are reliable measures of the
Table 3. Correlation matrix for relevance of potential benefits of membership.
Relevance of benefit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 A collective voice 1 .567 .304 .526 .546 .463 .513 .293 .520 .425 .413
2 A contact network 1 .576 .561 .585 .495 .584 .407 .547 .541 .554
3 New customer contacts 1 .408 .471 .391 .416 .256 .440 .580 .667
4 Access to local knowledge 1 .566 .501 .664 .333 .565 .463 .415
5 Peer support 1 .756 .610 .416 .581 .562 .551
6 Reduction of isolation 1 .663 .492 .574 .530 .420
7 Exchange of general information 1 .412 .626 .528 .474
8 An opportunity to socialise 1 .450 .307 .222
9 A sounding board for ideas 1 .599 .598
10 An improved reputation 1 .706
11 Greater visibility to customers 1
For all correlations, Pearson’s r> 0.01. Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicates all components are significantly correlated at
99% level. KMO measure of sampling adequacy .900.
Table 2. Mean scores for relevance of potential benefits from LBA membership.
Benefit Mean score for relevancea Standard deviation
Exchange of general information 3.85 1.024
Access to local knowledge 3.82 1.144
A contact network 3.77 1.182
A collective voice 3.75 1.214
Greater visibility to customers 3.66 1.311
A sounding board for ideas 3.57 1.147
An improved reputation 3.55 1.240
New customer contacts 3.32 1.431
Reduction of isolation 3.31 1.340
Peer support 3.30 1.246
An opportunity to socialise 3.01 1.253
aBased on a 5-point Likert scale where 1 represents ‘not relevant’ and 5 represents ‘very relevant’.
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underlying structure of beneﬁts, with high values for Cronbach’s alpha .887 and .849,
respectively (Table 5).
Table 5 details the allocation each type of potential beneﬁt between the two bundles with
which they are highly correlated. All the beneﬁts have a correlation of more than .350, which
is the minimum magnitude of factor loading for the sample size (Hair et al., 2010). The
sought-after beneﬁts with high loadings for Bundle 1 relate to opportunities to socialise,
reduced isolation and peer support, a collective voice, and access to local knowledge,
information exchange and ideas. These beneﬁts are sought by those members that want to
be informed, supported and integrated socially. Members of this group also identiﬁed the
Table 4. Factor analysis for the bundle of benefits.
Relevance of benefit
Factor number
Communality
1 2 h2
A collective voice .639 .106 .487
New customer contacts .007 .847 .711
Access to local knowledge .682 .135 .577
Peer support .694 .232 .699
Reduction of isolation .822 .034 .705
Exchange of general information .767 .121 .696
An opportunity to socialise .804 .256 .505
A sounding board for ideas .602 .319 .658
An improved reputation .224 .719 .729
Greater visibility to customers .041 .892 .834
Eigenvalue 5.510 1.091
% of variance explained 55.100 10.913
Cumulative % of variance explained 55.100 66.013
Principle component analysis using Oblimin with Kaiser normalisation.
Table 5. Bundle of benefits factors, loading and interpretation.
Factor and item Loading Interpretation
Factor 1
Reduction of isolation .822 Info-Social Benefits
An opportunity to socialise .804
General information exchange .767
Peer support .694
Access to local knowledge .682
Collective voice .639
Sounding board for ideas .602
Cronbach’s alpha¼ .887
Factor 2
Greater visibility to customers .892 Instrumental Benefits
New customer contacts .847
Improved reputation .719
Cronbach’s alpha¼ .849
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role of the associations in providing a wider collective voice within the local economy, as one
business owner explained:
All. . .activities are directed towards the overall improvement of trade through the promotion
and improvement of [the town] as a trading environment. It is towards this wider goal that active
members direct their eﬀorts, frequently at their own expense and to the detriment of the amount
of attention paid to their own business. (Member, LBA)
We label this bundle Info-Social Beneﬁts. Following thick rational choice theory, the beneﬁts
do not relate directly to an immediate commercial outcome, but rather to non-pecuniary
outcomes and goals.
Bundle 2 relates to the beneﬁts of membership for more direct pecuniary advantage,
including visibility to customers, new customer contacts, and improved reputation.
Following thin rational choice theory, these beneﬁts are based on members’ calculative
reasoning and are sought by those that want to utilise LBA membership to generate
ﬁnancial returns to the business. We label these Instrumental Beneﬁts.
Bundles 1 and 2 are strongly negatively correlated to one another1 (.504). This implies
that an increase in one corresponds with a decrease in the relevance of the other bundle. For
the sample overall, therefore, increases in the relevance of bundle 1 beneﬁts are accompanied
by a decreased interest in bundle 2 beneﬁts and vice versa.
There was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between businesses at diﬀerent stages of their life cycle
and the relevance of either beneﬁt bundle. However, length of membership had a signiﬁcant
impact on the relevance of instrumental beneﬁts (bundle 2). In both heterogeneous and
homogenous LBAs the relevance of bundle 2 beneﬁts declines signiﬁcantly with length of
membership. In contrast, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the relevance of info-social
beneﬁts (bundle1) by years of membership.
How do benefit bundles relate to business profile?
It is expected that businesses vary in terms of the beneﬁts sought from LBA membership.
To understand this further, cluster analysis was applied to deﬁne groups with the
maximum homogeneity within the groups and maximum heterogeneity between the
groups (Hair et al., 2010). Factor analysis preceded the cluster analysis since
multicollinearity between the variables selected for clustering would bias the results. The
factors formed the basis of the cluster analysis. The latter followed a two-stage approach.
First, a hierarchical approach was used to discern the number of clusters and proﬁle the
cluster centres. Then, the observations were clustered utilising a non-hierarchical method
(k-means) with the cluster centres from the hierarchical approach used as the initial seed
points. This combined procedure allows one to take maximum beneﬁt of the advantages
associated with hierarchical and non-hierarchical methods, while at the same time
minimising the drawbacks (Punj and Stewart, 1983). The clusters are validated based on
a set of additional continuous and categorical variables. A three cluster solution was
obtained: members seeking both instrumental and info-social beneﬁt bundles (Dual-
bundle); those seeking mainly instrumental beneﬁts (Instrumental); and those seeking
neither beneﬁt bundle but continuing to remain within membership (Habitual). Table 6
details the personal and business characteristics of each cluster. Statistical diﬀerences
between clusters are explored using Chi-square and ANOVA tests. It is notable that
every LBA contains a mix of these member proﬁles and that there is signiﬁcant
variance between them that is not explained by LBA homogeneity or funding type.
Table 1 describes this variance.
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Table 6. Profile of LBA member clusters.
Cluster name Key figures (mean)
Relevance of bundle
Key characteristics
Instrumental
benefit
Social
benefit
Cluster 1:
Dual-bundle
members
Satisfactiona: 3.95
Willingness to pay moreb:»86.10
Membership length: 5.32
Annual turnover: »61,329
Estimated financial gain from
membership over last 12
months: »381.00
High High
(1) Regard association as
performing well
(2) Highest gains of customers
and contacts
(3) Most able to recognize
financial gain
(4) Highest personal and
business benefit
(5) More likely to be female
(6) Previous employ in public
sector
(7) More likely to be running a
home based business
(8) More likely to purchase
locally
(9) Perceive high levels of trust
in business community
(10) Concerned with fair spread
of benefits
(11) See association as open to
new ideas
Cluster 2:
Instrumental
members
Satisfaction: 3.69
Willingness to pay more:»70.24
Membership length: 5.23
Annual turnover: »56,199
Estimated financial gain from
membership over last 12
months: »1,195.00
High Low
(1) Least likely to gain nothing
financially
(2) Highest level of financial
gain over 12 months
(3) Highest distance between
home and business
(4) Report the most
competitive environment
Cluster 3:
Habitual
members
Satisfaction: 3.43
Willingness to pay more:»56.73
Membership length: 9.42
Annual turnover: »97,689
Estimated financial gain from
membership over last 12
months: »3.00
Low Low
(1) Report lowest association
performance
(2) Lowest gains of customers
and contacts
(3) Most likely to gain nothing
financially
(4) More likely to be male
(5) Less likely to run a home
based business
(6) Highest turnover
(7) Least likely to purchase
locally
(8) Are the long-term members
aA post-usage measure of member satisfaction, scored on a 5-point Likert scale, 1¼ very dissatisfied, 5¼ very satisfied.
bMembers estimated how much more they were willing to pay to save the association from a fictional imminent closure.
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Dual-bundle members
Dual-bundle members account for 41.2% of the sample. Both instrumental and info-social
beneﬁts are highly relevant to this group. Firms in this cluster record the highest mean score
for satisfaction with membership and are willing to pay the most to save the association from
closure. They have gained the most new customers and useful contacts since joining. While
they report only a moderate ﬁnancial gain over the last 12 months as a result of association
membership (mean¼ »381, circa $596/445), this group is most able to attribute a ﬁnancial
gain to their membership of the LBA (61%). Since joining they are also the most likely to
report an improvement in their businesses’ performance and personal development, as well
as perceiving that the LBA makes an economic and social contribution to the community.
They are more likely to be female (accounting for 48% of all members of the cluster),
previously employed in the public sector (51%) and running a home-based business
(49%). The importance of info-social beneﬁts is reﬂected in their commitment to the local
economy, with 62% purchasing some products from within 30 miles, and in their higher
levels of trust regarding local businesses and other members, and their view that the
association is open to new ideas.
Instrumental members
Instrumental members account for 23.5% of the sample, for whom the instrumental beneﬁts
bundle is dominant. Its members report moderate levels for association performance and
gains of customers and useful contacts. They are the group least likely to view membership
as having led to no ﬁnancial gain and report the highest gain over the past 12 months
(mean¼ »1195, circa »1868/1396). They are most likely to report a highly competitive
business environment and their business premises are located further away from their
homes compared to the other groups.
We identiﬁed no signiﬁcant groupings of members who were interested solely in info-
social beneﬁts. This suggests that while providing non-pecuniary beneﬁts is necessary for
associations in meeting the sought-after needs of their members, associations will be unlikely
to sustain membership if they just seek to provide info-social beneﬁts alone. In other words,
while social beneﬁts are valued by members in the Dual-bundle group, LBAs need to couple
their delivery with more instrumental opportunities.
Habitual members
Habitual members, ﬁnding neither bundle relevant, accounted for 35.4% of the members2.
The survey had included a comprehensive listing of beneﬁts identiﬁed from the literature and
in turn validated by the LBA leaders as being broadly encompassing. It is therefore unlikely
that this ﬁnding is a result of not capturing another set of beneﬁts that this group of ﬁrms
was interested in. Members of this group tend to perceive weak association performance, low
levels of new customers and useful contacts as a result of membership, the highest likelihood
of gaining nothing ﬁnancially (64%), and when they do the lowest level of ﬁnancial gain over
the last 12 months (mean¼ »3, circa $4.7/3.5). They do not believe the association has
improved their personal development or business performance since joining and barely
agree that the association makes an economic contribution to the community. They are
more likely to be male, less likely to run a home based business and this cluster registers
the highest mean turnover. They are the least likely to purchase inputs locally and they are
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likely to have been members for the longest time (nine years on average). Overall, this cluster
contains relatively large and mature businesses which have outgrown the local economy and
association, perceive few beneﬁts as being relevant, but which nevertheless remain members.
Further research is needed to explain the reasoning behind the continued and apparently
habitual membership of these ﬁrms. One explanation, consistent with ‘thick’ rational choice
models, is that exiting an association may engender social costs. Thus individuals may
remain members out of a sense of duty (Hirschman, 1970), loyalty (Bennett, 2011), or
local social norms (Atterton, 2007). They may wish to avoid the reputational risk of being
seen by others as free riding on association beneﬁts. Where members have made friendships
and engaged together in collective action, leaving an association may cause emotional strain
(Rothenberg, 1988). It is also conceivable that these ﬁrms may remain a member in the hope
that eventually they will realise a return on their investment of time and resources in taking
part in a network (Kahneman et al., 1990). This may be in expectation of some speciﬁc
future beneﬁts (Renko et al., 2012; Sarasvathy, 2001) or as a contingency in helping deal with
future uncertainties (Fisher, 2012; Perry et al., 2012).
Implications for LBA leadership
The membership and beneﬁt proﬁles identiﬁed suggest strategies that LBA leaders should
consider in order to create the conditions that will sustain their associations. This is a major
challenge facing LBAs, which typically experience phases of membership stagnation and
inactivity. The ﬁndings suggest that a primary challenge lies in identifying and responding
to the particular beneﬁt bundles that are sought by member ﬁrms. In particular, meeting the
needs of members who are interested in dual-beneﬁts (both info-social and instrumental) is
key. It is these ﬁrms that tend to be the most satisﬁed with, and also most likely to commit in
the longer term to sustaining, the association.
In contrast, members who are solely interested in instrumental beneﬁts appear to see
diminishing value over time in their association membership, as pecuniary-based
networking opportunities are exhausted, meaning that they may be the ﬁrst to leave the
association or become habitual members. To sustain instrumental beneﬁts for these and
dual-beneﬁt members, a ﬂow of new members is therefore necessary. While leaders
believed their association to be welcoming of new members, few had an active recruitment
plan. Leaders’ time was largely spent on trying to persuade existing members to engage
more, rather than on recruiting new members. Other than a web presence, the LBAs in
the research did little to promote their services to the wider business community. However,
the recruitment of new members has the spillover eﬀect of delivering instrumental beneﬁts to
existing members who wish to build new business relationships. The survey ﬁndings also
suggest that the targeting of female-led and home-based ﬁrms would be especially valuable
priorities for recruitment, since they are more likely to be dual-bundle beneﬁt seeking
members and therefore more likely to commit for the longer term to the association.
On one level habitual members may appear problematic as they register the lowest levels of
satisfaction and appear to derive few beneﬁts from LBAmembership. Understanding their needs
and recognising their potential value to the association should be an important focus for LBA
leadership. This group includes the largest ﬁrms, which typically have ‘out-grown’ the local
economy, serving largely extra-local markets. Such ﬁrms may represent an untapped resource
for LBAs in acting as a pool of mentors, and source of advice, knowledge and contacts for newer
and smaller businesses. Small business owners have a higher regard for advice received from
other, successful businesses compared to public sector agencies (Bennett and Robson, 2001).
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Thus, while gaining few instrumental or info-social beneﬁts themselves, their presence as
members may be of signiﬁcant value to other ﬁrms within the LBAs. They may therefore be
an important resource for recruiting and retaining other members, as well as bringing
reputational credibility and membership weight to an association’s external proﬁle and inﬂuence.
Finally, from observing these associations over a period of time, it is apparent that they
lack formal feedback mechanisms from their memberships. The research suggests that the
sourcing of regular formal feedback would beneﬁt associations, by equipping them with an
understanding of the bundles of beneﬁts that are sought after by their members, how these
may be diﬀerentiated across their membership base, their current levels of satisfaction, and
how the LBA could be improved.
Conclusion
This paper demonstrates the need for a diﬀerentiated view of the sought-after beneﬁts by
members of LBAs. Such an understanding is vital in satisfying the aspirations of members
and for inter-ﬁrm cooperation within networks to be sustained. The ﬁndings therefore have
important implications for the future strategies of LBA leaders and the stability and
adaptation of business networks in general, which can often struggle to maintain a
supportive and active membership base.
For the ﬁrst time, we have identiﬁed the beneﬁt bundles sought by members of LBAs. From a
large membership survey, two distinct beneﬁt bundles have been ascertained (instrumental and
info-social), linked to diﬀerent rational choice approaches. Given a negative correlation between
these bundles, there may be trade-oﬀs in their delivery. Moreover, their relevance varies across
LBA membership proﬁles and according to length of membership. Around two ﬁfths of
members (Cluster 1: Dual-bundle members) regarded both instrumental and info-social
beneﬁts as important. Info-social beneﬁts are especially relevant for longstanding members.
Other members prioritise instrumenta beneﬁts (Cluster 2: Instrumental members). These
beneﬁts are likely to become less relevant over time, as members exhaust opportunities to
meet and cultivate new customers. A ﬁnal set of members seek few instrumental or info-
social beneﬁts, but nevertheless remain within the LBA and may represent an important, but
often untapped, resource for the associations (Cluster 3: Habitual members).
While provision of info-social ties plays a vital role in sustaining members’ longer term
satisfaction with LBAs, the research highlights the importance of dual provision (info-social
alongside instrumental beneﬁts). To deliver instrumental beneﬁts and thus for this to be a
sustainable approach LBAs require a continuous supply of new members. Without this,
delivering instrumental beneﬁts will be more problematic as opportunities for expansion
of the customer base are exhausted. LBAs should therefore prioritise strengthening their
external proﬁle and recruitment of new entrants.
The paper has shown that while thin rational choice theory readily ﬁts with the pecuniary
motivations of Instrumentalmembers, it does not describe Dual-bundle orHabitualmembers,
where it is necessary to turn to insights from thick rational choice theory. In particular the
proﬁle of habitual members suggests that many ﬁnd it diﬃcult to identify speciﬁc beneﬁts
received but nonetheless remain longstanding LBA members. To understand the motives of
this cluster, it is necessary to move away from the notion that pecuniary rewards to the
individual, relative to personally occurred costs, drive all behaviour. The analysis points to a
need for future research into how LBAs can eﬀectively achieve an optimum balance of the
membership proﬁles and beneﬁts, appropriate to their local socio-economic circumstances,
which can best enable them to be sustained and adapt over time.
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Notes
1. Within principal component analysis, oblique rotation was used to preserve real world correlations
between factors.
2. As newer members were slightly more likely to respond to the survey, the percentage of members
identified as habitual is likely to be higher than the current analysis suggests.
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